Why Does Every War by the Zionist Regime Against Hezbollah End in Retreat and the Survival of the Resistance?

Covert Reconstruction and Strategic Surprise on the Battlefield
The prevailing perception within the Zionist regime and among its Western allies following the fragile 2024 ceasefire was that Hezbollah had been pushed back “for decades” and that its missile arsenal had been destroyed.
However, developments on the ground over the past six weeks have challenged this narrative, indicating that Hezbollah, by adopting a strategy of “covert reconstruction” during the fifteen-month ceasefire, has transformed itself into a more agile, decentralized structure based on small guerrilla units.
According to multiple field reports, Israel’s ground offensive in southern Lebanon aimed to establish a “buffer zone” extending five to ten kilometers deep—and even reaching the Litani River—in order to shield its northern settlements from Hezbollah’s short-range missiles.
Nevertheless, prominent Israeli military analysts, including Amos Harel in Haaretz, acknowledge that despite continuous and heavy bombardment, the Israeli army has failed to achieve this objective.
Hezbollah has not only succeeded in rebuilding its combat capabilities between the two wars, but has also continued its operations in the area between the southern border and the Litani River by employing guerrilla warfare tactics and extensive use of underground tunnels.
This battlefield reality has led the Israeli army to show “less enthusiasm” for expanding the scope of its ground operations in Lebanon. The bitter memories of interventions in the 1980s and 1990s—which ultimately culminated in Israel’s complete and humiliating withdrawal in 2000—continue to cast a shadow over the current decision-making of military commanders.
 
Sustained Missile Fire and the Collapse of the Narrative of Arsenal Destruction
Contrary to initial assumptions that Hezbollah’s missile arsenal had been destroyed, the group is now launching, on average, nearly 200 rockets and drones daily toward northern Israel.
This volume of fire far exceeds what the Israeli public had expected based on the official narrative of Hezbollah’s “defeat,” contributing to a growing crisis of confidence within the occupied territories.
Israeli security sources have acknowledged a major miscalculation by Netanyahu’s government in assessing Hezbollah’s missile capabilities, stating that the group still possesses “thousands of long-range missiles” as well as the necessary command-and-control capacity to target Israel’s strategic depth.
Historical experience in Hezbollah–Israel conflicts shows that the occupation of southern Lebanon has consistently ended in unilateral withdrawal by Zionist forces.
The withdrawal of 2000, following eighteen years of occupation, and the stalemate-like end of the 33-day war in 2006 are clear examples of this recurring pattern.
Today, given the Israeli army’s reluctance to become entangled in an “endless war” and a war of attrition in southern Lebanon, as well as increasing public pressure for the return of tens of thousands of displaced residents to their homes in the north, the scenario of history repeating itself—with another Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon—is not a remote possibility, but rather the most likely outcome.
 
Political Struggle in Beirut and the Disarmament Project
At the same time as the flames of war burn on the southern front, a political battle is underway in Beirut aimed at disarming Hezbollah and removing it from the country’s political and security structure.
The Western-oriented government of Lebanon’s President, Joseph Aoun, under intense international pressure—particularly from the United States—has initiated plans to disarm Hezbollah and establish a state monopoly over weapons. State media report that both he and Nawaf Salam are determined to advance this path.
However, this project faces deep-rooted and fundamental obstacles stemming from Hezbollah’s entrenched social, military, and political foundations.
According to independent assessments by Western and regional security institutions, Hezbollah’s military wing is significantly more powerful than Lebanon’s official army and is regarded as the most powerful non-state actor in the world.
Although the Lebanese army claims that it has achieved part of the objectives of disarming the resistance south of the Litani River, Hezbollah still possesses a vast arsenal of precision-guided missiles and attack drones, and has maintained its indigenous capability to produce weapons in Lebanese territory.
More importantly, Hezbollah considers disarmament to be “a major mistake serving Israel’s aggressive objectives” and has explicitly rejected any coercive action by the government in this regard, viewing it as a betrayal of the cause of resistance.
Another factor is the popular base of the Lebanese resistance and historical experience. Even at a time when Hezbollah did not yet exist, Lebanon was subjected to invasion and aggression by the Zionist regime. Public opinion in Lebanon understands that the Zionists’ concern regarding Hezbollah is not merely about it as a threat, but rather about it as a major obstacle preventing the regime’s incursions into Lebanese territory.
For this reason, the Western-oriented Lebanese government will never be able to persuade public opinion in the country to bargain over or disarm the resistance.
 
Hezbollah: A State Within a State with Deep Social Roots
The Hezbollah movement is not merely a guerrilla military group; it is a “state within a state,” with an extensive and highly efficient network of social services, educational institutions, media outlets, and economic entities embedded within Lebanon’s Shi'ie community—ensuring the firm loyalty of a significant number of the population.
The party itself holds fifteen seats out of the 128-seat Lebanese parliament and, through the strategic March 8 Alliance and its longstanding partnership with the Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri, applies considerable political influence over decision-making structures in Beirut.
In reality, efforts to disarm Hezbollah are not merely a technical or military issue within the realm of security; they represent a deeply political—and even identity-based—challenge for a significant segment of Lebanon’s population, which views Hezbollah not as a militia, but as a guarantor of its security and dignity in the face of external threats, particularly from the Zionist regime.
The government of Joseph Aoun is well aware of the potentially disastrous consequences of attempting to forcibly eliminate Hezbollah. A senior Lebanese official, speaking anonymously, has told the media that Aoun “does not want to make the disarmament process too public, as he fears it could provoke hostility and tension with the Shi'ie community in the south of the country.”
This is why Israel dismissed Aoun’s historic proposal for normalization of relations and direct negotiations, as political and security leaders in Tel Aviv have concluded that “the Lebanese government cannot act against Hezbollah without risking a civil war.”
 
The Shadow of Internal Conflict and the Threat of a “public Tsunami”
Analysts have also emphasized in recent reports that “the Lebanese government cannot implement major political decisions without securing Hezbollah’s implicit or explicit consent.”
Hezbollah leaders have explicitly warned that any attempt to weaken or disarm the group would be met with a strong and decisive public response.
Mahmoud Qomati, Deputy Head of Hezbollah’s Political Council, recently predicted that after the end of the war, a “public tsunami” would sweep away the Lebanese government “along with its sins.”
This threat is not some kind of empty rhetoric or mere propaganda; rather, it reflects Hezbollah’s real capacity for mass mobilization and its ability to generate widespread political instability in Lebanon.
Lebanon’s historical experience also shows that whenever Hezbollah’s existence or military power has been seriously challenged, the group has mobilized its supporters, taken control of the social and political space, and seized the initiative from its rivals, ultimately shifting the balance in its favor.
 
The Repetition of History and the Endurance of Resistance
Ultimately, the ongoing war in southern Lebanon appears to be repeating a familiar pattern from past conflicts: initial tactical advances by the Zionist regime’s army in the early hours and days, which ultimately give way to Hezbollah’s strategic victory and the forced withdrawal of Zionist forces.
Tel Aviv, now finding itself entangled in an “endless war” across multiple fronts, lacks the military and human resources—as well as the political will—necessary for a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon or the complete destruction of Hezbollah’s military and human infrastructure.
On Lebanon’s domestic front as well, the efforts of Aoun’s Western-oriented government to disarm and remove Hezbollah from the balance of power are doomed to fail, given the group’s deep social roots, superior military capabilities, and undeniable political influence.
The Lebanese resistance has once again demonstrated that it can absorb severe and devastating strikes, rapidly rebuild itself, and remain a central and irremovable actor in the complex equations of Lebanon and the region.
As a prominent Zionist analyst recently acknowledged, Israel’s political and military leaders have reached the unavoidable conclusion that their enemies “cannot be completely eliminated.”
Hezbollah, relying on its deeply rooted social foundations and its distinguished historical experience of resistance, will once again bring this undeniable reality to the attention of the world.